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ABSTRACT
Mining is the foundation of blockchain-based cryptocurrencies
such as Bitcoin rewarding the miner for finding blocks for new
transactions. The Monero currency enables mining with standard
hardware in contrast to special hardware (ASICs) as often used in
Bitcoin, paving the way for in-browser mining as a new revenue
model for website operators. In this work, we study the prevalence
of this new phenomenon. We identify and classify mining websites
in 138M domains and present a new fingerprinting method which
finds up to a factor of 5.7 more miners than publicly available
block lists. Our work identifies and dissects Coinhive as the major
browser-mining stakeholder. Further, we present a new method to
associate mined blocks in the Monero blockchain to mining pools
and uncover that Coinhive currently contributes 1.18% of mined
blocks having turned over 1293 Moneros in June 2018.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→Malware and its mitigation; • Net-
works→ Network measurement;
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1 INTRODUCTION
The web economy has traditionally used advertisements as means
to monetize services that are offered free of charge. This business
model relies on the implicit agreement between content providers
and users where viewing ads is the price for the “free” content.
This traditional approach has very recently been complemented
by a new monetizing model in which the computational resources
of website visitors are used to mine cryptocurrencies to generate
revenue for the website operators (browser-based mining).
Mining is the method of producing new blocks in blockchain
systems, most prominently cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin. It
requires miners to solve a computationally expensive puzzle to
cryptographically link a new block to the previous block in the
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blockchain. The difficulty to solve this puzzle depends on the com-
bined computing power of all users—depending on the difficulty, an
individual requires powerful machines to increase the probability of
mining a block (e.g., GPUs, FPGAs, or even ASICs). To provide an in-
centive for contributing computational power, miners are awarded
currency for every mined block. This monetary reward has ren-
dered crypto mining a business—browser-based mining extends
this business to monetize the web.
Not all cryptocurrencies are equally suited for browser-based
mining. The hardware imbalance and the consequential high diffi-
culty to mine Bitcoin renders its in-browser mining inefficient and
motivates the use of, e.g., Monero as an alternative currency that can
be efficiently mined on CPUs and thus browsers. Given its design,
Monero has been adopted by websites (e.g., The Piratebay or a video
streaming service with subsequent media exposure [9, 28]) and even
among botnets to mine on millions of compromised hosts [18]. To
ease browser mining, APIs [5, 6] exist, e.g., for in-game financ-
ing [7], link forwarding [16], captchas, during video streaming [10]
or even as an entry fee for parties [15]. Our work identifies Coin-
hive [5] as a widely used service which provides a framework for
embedding a Monero miner into a website. While these frameworks
enable mining without the users’ knowledge (cryptojacking), other
services (Authedmine) actively ask users for their consent to do so
as an alternative to displaying ads. Besides media reports, little is
known about the ubiquity and use of browser-based mining.
Given these new possibilities, we provide a first in-depth study
of the prevalence and economics of browser-based mining as a new
web business model. We base this perspective on crawls of 137M
.com/.net/.org domains and the Alexa Top 1M list to first identify
sites using browser-based mining enabling to create a new finger-
printing method to identify mining code. Second, we dissect the
short link service of the largest web-mining stakeholder Coinhive
and screen their market power and profits. Our contributions are:
• We investigate the prevalence of browser-mining in the three
largest TLDs and the Alexa Top 1M, i.e., at over 138M domains.
• We present a new Wasm-based fingerprinting method showing
the inadequate capabilities of block lists to detect mining.
• Moreover, we identify the largest browser-based mining provider
Coinhive and dissect their link-forwarding service.
• We present a novel methodology enabling us to associate blocks
in a privacy-preserving blockchain to a mining pool.
• By applying our methodology, we screen Coinhive and show that
they contribute 1.18% of the blocks in the Monero blockchain
mining Moneros worth 150,000 USD per month (as of writing).
Structure. Section 2 establishes the basics of mining. Section 3
measures the prevalence of browser-mining. Section 4 studies the
practices, userbase, and economics of Coinhive. Section 5 discusses
related work and Section 6 concludes the paper.
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Figure 1: Monero blockchain and PoWmining input.
2 BROWSER-BASED MINING 101
Blockchain-based cryptocurrencies build on the principle of embed-
ding financial transactions in a public, tamper-proof series of blocks.
To evolve the system, new blocks must constantly be appended to
store pending transactions; their generation is calledmining. Miners
solve a crypto puzzle as a proof of work (PoW) whose difficulty is
dynamically adjusted to produce new blocks at a constant block rate
guaranteeing predictability and tamper resistance. Consequently,
when more miners compete for finding blocks, the difficulty rises
such that the block rate is met. When the PoW meets the difficulty,
it links the newly mined block (containing new transactions) to the
previous one rewarding the miner with currency in exchange for
the contributed computing power.
The recent hype around cryptocurrencies has led to substantial
increases in difficulty resulting in the need for faster hardware
to mine blocks profitably w.r.t. the energy costs. To increase the
chance of earning currency, miners seek to increase their available
computational power. This quest for speed is currently served by
GPUs, FPGAs, or even specialized ASICs. One can host substantial
amounts of mining hardware in dedicated data centers. Another
way is to bundle the computing power of multiple miners inmining
pools that share the earned revenue for the newly mined block.
Browser-based Mining. Utilizing the computation power of web-
site visitors provides yet another mean of increasing the mining
power. By embedding mining code into websites, a miner can make
use of the visitor’s CPU resources during the visit. The website oper-
ator thereby saves energy costs and mining hardware investments.
Thus, web-based mining is an alternative revenue generating model
to monetize websites and services. However, hidden mining or with-
out user consent (i.e., cryptojacking) poses a significant challenge
and it is a known attack vector (Section 5). While browser miners
for Bitcoin exist (e.g., jsMiner from 2011 [30]), the performance im-
balance between CPUs, GPUs, and ASICs poses an insurmountable
challenge for Bitcoin browser mining. Consequently, browser-based
mining requires cryptocurrencies with PoW functions that are only
efficiently computable on CPUs.
Monero. Launched in 2014, Monero [25] (see Figure 1) is a privacy-
preserving cryptocurrency whose PoW is designed to be ASIC
resistant (memory intensive and periodically redesigned) enabling
CPUs and thus browser-based mining. Specifically, it uses the Cryp-
tonight hash function [23] in its PoW to mine a new block with an
average block rate of two minutes. Figure 1 shows the PoW inputs;
in Monero, a miner constructs a Merkle tree of the transactions that
are to be included in the new block, requiring at least the Coinbase
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Figure 2: NoCoin detected miners on the Alexa Top 1M and
.com/.net/.org domains.
transaction paying the block reward to the miner. A node in this
tree is the hash of its two children with the hash of the transactions
as the leaves of the tree. Including the tree’s root links the trans-
actions to the PoW and the final block. Now the miner’s goal is to
find a nonce such that the PoW output (a hash) meets the global
difficulty (here, literally the product of the hash multiplied by the
difficulty must be smaller than 2256). Thus, a miner needs to draw a
new nonce and recompute the hash until it satisfies this goal. The
network can easily verify that the proof holds through a single
round of hashing, and by including the block in the blockchain,
rewards the miner with the block reward expressed through the
Coinbase transaction. When using mining pools, the pool pushes
jobs (containing the PoW input) asking the miners participating in
the pool to find a nonce that satisfies a lower difficulty than that
of the total network. When this lower difficulty is met, the miner
is awarded a share of the final block reward and if by chance the
actual difficulty is also met, the pool mined a block.
3 PREVALENCE OF BROWSER MINING
We start our analysis of browser-based mining by investigating its
prevalence in the web. Thus, we visit landing pages of a large body
of domains and identify the presence of mining code using two
approaches. Initially, we use a light-weight approach to download
website landing pages via TLS across several datasets, i.e., .com
(∼116M), .net (∼12M), .org (∼9M), and Alexa Top 1M (∼950K), and
match their HTML body against a public filter list (Section 3.1).
Subsequently, we instruct a Chrome browser to visit a subset of
these domains to execute the webpage code and thereby monitor
Websocket interactions and WebAssembly (Wasm) code as preva-
lent techniques for browser-based mining (Section 3.2). We obtain
our datasets through DNS resolutions [11] from zone files available
at Verisign [27] (.net/.com) and PIR [19] (.org).
3.1 NoCoin List
We visit every domain, prefixed with www., via TLS and download
the first 256 kB of the domains’ landing pages using zgrab. 256 kB
offers a good tradeoff between capturing most content (i.e., scripts
are often located in the head of the document) and having a point
where to stop downloading when pages do not stop sending data.
We then extract all javascript tags using lxml to apply the NoCoin
filter list [12]. This list contains regular expressions to detect and
subsequently block mining code using common ad blockers. Fig-
ure 2 shows the number of domains with hits to NoCoin filter rules
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Alexa .orgClass. Count Class. Count
1 coinhive 311 coinhive 711
2 skencituer 123 cryptoloot 183
3 cryptoloot 103 web.stati.bid 120
4 UnknownWSS 56 freecontent.date 108
5 notgiven688 46 notgiven688 92
Total WebAssembly 796 WebAssembly 1491
Table 1: Top 5 (∼80%) WebAssembly signatures. Most Web-
Assembly are miners (∼96%), dominated by Coinhive.
on the top x-axis. Relative to the number of domains, the bars on the
y-axis show the relative share of the top 5 mining scripts (multiple
per website possible). We find the prevalence of mining websites to
be rather low. Yet in comparison, (popular) Alexa-listed domains
have the largest share (up to 0.07%). This seems likely since mining
is most profitable with websites having many visitors. Looking at
the miners, we find Coinhive, a Monero-based miner to be most
prevalent (used by > 75% of the mining sites). Notably, Authedmine,
a variant of Coinhive asking for explicit user consent to mine and
wp-monero a WordPress plugin follows but at much lower shares.
We find other miners with smaller shares, e.g., Cryptoloot a Coin-
hive clone. By manually inspecting a random subset, we find false
positives, e.g., cpmstar is a gaming ad-network that we could not
verify to contain mining code. For the once popular jsMiner [30],
we find only 31 instances in all datasets combined.
Takeaway.We observe a low prevalence of mining in landing pages
according to the NoCoin list. Most miners are Monero-based with
Coinhive having the largest share (> 75%).
3.2 Chrome
We complement the NoCoin analysis by broadly investigating pat-
terns of mining behavior when actually executing the pages. This
enables to find mining domains beyond NoCoin-listed pattern.
Through manual miner code inspection, we find that the major-
ity of javascript miners utilizes WebAssembly (Wasm) for efficient
PoW calculation. WebAssembly [29] is a binary instruction format—
featured in recent browsers—that enables to compile e.g., C-code to
Wasm for efficient execution within the browser. Further, the com-
munication to the backend servers providing the PoW input often
uses Websockets. To detect these, we instrument a stock Chrome
web browser using the Chrome Dev Protocol [3] to capture all
Websocket communication and to dump all detected Wasm code.
To decide when a page is fully loaded, we wait for the page’s load
event and set a 2 s timer on every DOM change but wait no longer
than additional 5 s before we mark the page as loaded completely.
In case of no load event, we wait no longer than 15 s to mark the
website as timed out. We further save the first 65 kB of the final
HTML to enable comparison with the NoCoin list used previously.
Measurements. As this measurement is more time consuming,
we restrict our scope to the .org zone and the Alexa 1M. We pre-
fix every domain with http://www. allowing Chrome to follow
redirects to the secured variant if necessary. Thus in contrast to
our previous TLS-only measurement, we also analyze non-HTTPS
websites. We build signatures from the Wasm code by combining
(in a strict order) and then hashing the contained functions with
NoCoin
Hits
having Wasm
Miner
Wasm
Hits
blocked
by NoCoin
missed
by NoCoin
Alexa 993 129 737 129 608 (82%)
.org 978 450 1372 450 922 (67%)
Table 2: Miners on Chrome data (incl. non-TLS) found
through NoCoin and by our WebAssembly signatures.
Alexa .orgNoCoin Signature NoCoin Signature
1 Gaming 19% Pornogr. 19% Gaming 29% Religion 9%
2 Edu. Site 9% Tech. 8% Business 8% Business 8%
3 Shopping 8% Filesharing 8% Edu. Site 6% Edu. Site 8%
4 Pornogr. 7% Edu. Site 5% Pornogr. 5% Health Site 7%
5 Tech. 6% Ent. & Music 5% Shopping 4% Tech. 6%
Categorized 79% 74% 54% 42%
Table 3: Top 5 categories according to Symantec RuleSpace.
SHA256. Through manual inspection of the Wasm, we build up a
database of ∼160 different assemblies (often versions of the con-
ceptually same Miner) that we found and categorized them, e.g.,
through their Websocket communication backend or by some other
distinguishing feature that we found in the code. Such features e.g.,
comprises the number of XOR, shift or load operations which we
found to be quite distinctive or function name hinting at the hash
function itself.
Table 1 summarizes our findings for the Alexa 1M and the .org
TLD from measurements in the first two weeks of May 2018. We
observe most Wasm code to contain mining functionality and most
miners are again Coinhive. To put the Chrome-based approach
in perspective to the NoCoin list, we apply the NoCoin block list
to HTML saved by Chrome, i.e., after the execution of javascripts.
Table 2 shows the number of miners detected by the NoCoin list and
the fraction of miningWasm on this part as well as the total number
of websites classified through our Miner Wasm signature database
and the subset of websites that were detected by the NoCoin list. We
observe that NoCoin classifies many websites as miners, of which
only a fraction actually embeds mining Wasm code. This indicates
false positives which we verified through random inspections. If
we take a look at the websites for which we found Wasm mining
signatures, again, the NoCoin list only classifies a fraction of these
as having a miner—false negatives.
Classification. We use the Symantec RuleSpace1 [24] engine to
categorize theminingwebsites. Table 3 shows the top 5 categories to
which RuleSpace assigned the websites for the NoCoin list matches
as well as our signature-based approach. We observe a diverse set
of categories and that RuleSpace can classify a larger body of Alexa
domains than .org domains. Interestingly, the categories for NoCoin
and our approach differ, especially the top category shows a large
mismatch, i.e., Gaming vs. Pornography and Gaming vs. Religion.
This could be caused by the aforementioned gaming ad-network.
Takeaway. Miners are already embedded on websites today. Simple
block lists are ineffective to detect them all and our signature-based
approach can detect sites beyond the NoCoin block list. Still, Coinhive
is the most used mining service.
1Used in Symantec products to classify websites.
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Figure 3: The number of links per token (users) is heavily
biased towards a small number of users.
4 THE COINHIVE SERVICE
Coinhive provides a mining service advertised with the slogan
“Monetize Your Business With Your Users’ CPU Power” [5], we ob-
served Coinhive to have the most widespread use (see Section 3).
Their services are built on providing a highly optimized Monero
javascript miner to be embedded in websites. In turn, Coinhive
keeps 30% of the mined reward. Apart from offering this API, Coin-
hive offers e.g., a Captcha service and a short link forwarding service
which is the subject of our first analysis. Our tools on which the
following analysis is based are available at [20].
Regardless of the actual service, the process works as follows: i)
A Coinhive user (e.g., a website owner) is assigned a unique token
that is included in the API calls which is used to associate the mined
shares. ii) Upon a website visit, the miner is loaded and connects to
the Coinhive pool and authorizes with the user’s token to receive
input for hashing. iii) Once a valid hash is found, it is committed to
the Coinhive pool. iv) Eventually, Coinhive pays their users 70% of
the block reward and keeps the remaining 30%.
4.1 Short Link Forwarding Service
To begin analyzing Coinhive, we focus on its short link forwarding
service, which is similar to a common short link service (e.g., bit.ly)
but additionally requires to compute a configurable number of
hashes before resolving the link. When a user visits a link, she
only sees a progress bar indicating the share of hashes that have
been computed, when all locally computed hashes have been sent
to the service (i.e., the progress bar is full), the service will return
the original link and will instruct the browser to redirect the user
to it. This link redirection monetization is comparable to short
link services delaying the redirection while serving advertisements
and paying the link creator a commission [14]. With Coinhive, the
creator of the short link receives a share of the block reward that is
mined by the users visiting the short links.
Their short links follow a simple structure, identified by an al-
phanumeric ID: https://cnhv.co/[a-z0-9]. We observed that
new links are assigned increasing IDs which enables one to enumer-
ate the link address space. As of February 2018, up to 4 characters
are used, resulting in a total of 1,709,203 active short links. We
visit all links and gather the Coinhive redirection HTML document
to collect i) the link creator’s token—used to associate performed
hashes to the link creator—as well as ii) the number of hash compu-
tations required by the link creator to resolve the link. Even though
a single user could own multiple tokens, we will regard users and
tokens as synonymous in this paper.
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Figure 4: Required number of hashes and their frequency
of occurrence as well as the time it takes to compute these
hashes. Please note the skewed x-axis.
Without actually computing hashes, we can already look at i)
the distribution of short links per Coinhive users as well as ii) the
required number of hashes to resolve the links. Figure 3 shows the
distribution of short links per user. We observe a power-law which
highlights the existence of a few heavy users that created a large
number of links. In fact, 1/3 of all links are contributed by a single
user only and roughly 85% of all links are created by only 10 users.
Of course, a single user could use multiple tokens, however, this
would only emphasize our current observations.
To actually resolve the link, the user needs to compute the re-
quired number of hashes set by the link creator. Figure 4 shows
the distribution of this link resolution difficulty in the number of
required hash computations. The blue (dark) portion of the CDF
depicts all observed links, while the red (light) portion removes
the previously observed bias by heavy user by counting a required
# hashes only once per user; i.e., 1000 links from the same user with
the same number of required hash computations are only counted
once instead of 1000 times as in the blue (dark) dataset. To provide
a perspective on the time it takes to resolve a short link, the top
x-axis shows the duration to compute the required # of Cryptonight
hashes in a Chrome browser with a commodity laptop2. We observe
that the majority of links can be resolved in less than 51 sec (1024
hashes). The heavy user bias is most prominent at 512 hashes, still,
when removing the user-bias over 2/3 of the links of all users can
be solved with at most 1024 hashes in below one minute. To our
surprise, many links require a longer time to resolve; we find many
different users and over hundreds of short links that set the max-
imum of 1019 hashes which takes several billion years to resolve.
While the user’s willingness to wait certainly depends on the con-
tent that is supposed to be behind a short link, high values suggest
either no desire to have them ever resolved or misconfigurations
(e.g., short link creators are not aware of the actual duration).
Link Destinations. To understand the kinds of links that the short
link service is used for, we resolve all links which require less
than 10K hashes from the unbiased dataset (covering 85% of this
dataset see red (light) CDF in Figure 4). Additionally, we resolve
a random sample of 1000 links for each of the top ten Coinhive
users. To efficiently resolve the short links without a web browser,
we replicate the working principle of the web miner in a non-web
implementation that can resolve multiple short links in parallel
making use of the official optimized Monero hash code. We found
22013 Macbook Pro 2.8 GHz Intel Core i7: 20 h/s with 4 threads.
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Domain Category Freq. Domain Category Freq.
youtu.be Ent. & Music 20% ftbucket.info Msg. Board 9.9%
zippyshare.com Filesharing 10% getcoinfree.com Finance 9.2%
icerbox.com Filesharing 10% ul.to Filesharing 4.2%
hq-mirror.de Ent. & Music 10% share-online.biz Filesharing 2.9%
andyspeed
racing.com Automotive 10%
oboom.com Filesharing 2.8%
Table 4: Top 10 domains in 89% of all samples from the top
10 short link creators.
that Coinhive alters the block header contained in the PoW inputs
before sending them to the users which the web miner reverts deep
within its WebAssembly3. This appears to be a countermeasure
to prevent using the Coinhive web miner outside of the Coinhive
environment, e.g., in custom mining pools. We had to roughly
compute 61.5M hashes which we were able to do in little less than
two days on a capable server machine.
Top 10 User.We first investigate a random sample from all short
links of the top 10 users (1000 links each) representing 80% of the
link targets. Table 4 shows a classification for the top 10 domains
(accounting for roughly 89% of all sampled URLs) that we extracted
from the destination URL. We again utilize the RuleSpace categories
to manually classify those 10 domains. As the table shows, most
links point to streaming and filesharing services.
Top Categories.We employ the RuleSpace engine to further clas-
sify the unbiased dataset into categories. One URL can havemultiple
categories, therefore, a single URL can contribute to different cate-
gories. For roughly 1/3 of the URLs RuleSpace has no classification,
for the remainder, Table 5 lists the top 10 categories and how often
a URL falls into each category. We observe that sites to fall into a di-
verse set of categories, unlike the top 10 users for which filesharing
and streaming were the dominant categories (Table 4).
Takeaway. Coinhive’s link forwarding service is dominated by links
from only 10 users. They mostly redirect to streaming videos and
filesharing sites. We find that most short links can be resolved within
minutes, however, some links require millions of hashes to be computed
which is infeasible.
4.2 Estimating the Network Size
While we find many websites to use Coinhive (see Section 3), it
remains unclear how many users visit these sites. Thus, the mining
power and the achievable payouts are unknown. To understand the
available mining power and thereby the users of Coinhive, we need
to identify which blocks in the Monero blockchain were mined
through Coinhive.
Methodology.When a block is mined by the Coinhive network,
one of the clients must have found a nonce that satisfies the PoW
difficulty. Then, a new block can be mounted into the blockchain
which contains the block header that is also part of the PoW input,
as well as all the transactions that have implicitly been included in
the PoW input through the Merkle tree root (see Figure 1). Thus, if
we find the PoW input for which a suitable nonce was found, we
can investigate the blockchain and look at the block that succeeds
the block referenced in the PoW. If the transactions in that block
form a Merkle tree whose root is equal to that in the PoW input, we
3A simple XOR with a fixed value at a fixed offset
Category Count Category Count
Tech. & Telecomm. 1,522 Shopping 572
Gaming 737 Finance and Investing 502
Dynamic Site 727 Ent. & Music 313
Business 578 Educational Site 305
Pornography 577 Hosting 298
Table 5: Top 10 categories of the unbiased dataset < 10K
hashes.
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Figure 5: Mined blocks over time from the Coinhive net-
work. Black parts mark outages of our infrastructure.
can be sure that the PoW input was the one that was used to mine
the block. This uniquely identifies the origin as each block contains
the Coinbase transaction (first leaf of the Merkle tree) which is
used to pay the block rewards to the miner (i.e., Coinhive). Thus
we could never by accident see a Merkle tree root of another miner
in the PoW input.
We investigate the PoW inputs that are delegated by Coinhive
to its users by connecting to one of their mining pools and request
a new PoW input every 500ms. As the network finds a new block
on average every two minutes, we cluster the PoW inputs by the
pointer to the previous (at time of reception, most recent) block.
We found that we never obtain more than 8 different PoW inputs
(even though more exist theoretically). Coinhive currently operates
32 mining endpoints (which can be gathered from the javascript
or by enumerating the domain name), when we connect to all of
them and repeat the process, we observe at most 128 different PoW
inputs per block. While this suggests that there are two endpoints
per backend system, it also puts us into the position to actually
investigate each of the 128 PoW inputs and check the Merkle tree
root against the Merkle tree root of the transactions in the block
that was actually mined after that referenced in the PoW input.
Measurements. We have been requesting new PoW inputs for
four weeks and we are thus able to confidently estimate a lower
bound on the blocks mined through Coinhive. Figure 5 shows a blue
block for every Coinhive-mined block as well as the total number
of blocks on that day. As finding blocks correlate with users mining
through Coinhive, we were interested to see if blocks are found
at certain times which could hint at the geolocation of the users.
However, the figure (upper subplot) shows that blocks are found
throughout the whole day which might be an indicator of the global
reach of Coinhive. We find multiple days with significantly more
blocks than on average, e.g., the 30th of April, 10th and 22nd of
May 2018. The 30th of April precedes Labor Day, a public holiday in
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Med. Avg. Hashrate Currency
[blocks/day] [MH/s] [XMR]
May 9.0 8.8 5.5 1231
June 10.0 9.7 5.5 1293
July 9.0 9.1 5.8 1215
Table 6: Coinhive mining statistics for three month in 2018.
over 80 countries, time zone shifts to UTC or holidays could explain
increased Internet usage resulting in more mined blocks. Similarly,
the latter two were Ascension Day and the day after Pentecost,
both public holiday in many (mostly) European countries.
In the median (average), we find 8.5 (9.0) blocks per day, we
noticed a disruption of Coinhive’ service on the 6th and 7th of
May which resulted in only a few to no announced PoW inputs.
We can estimate the combined hash rate of Coinhive by taking
the network’s difficulty into account. The difficulty denotes the ex-
pected number of hashes that are required to find a block which is
adjusted after each block such that the block rate of two minutes is
met. Over the course of our observations, the median difficulty was
55.4G hashes, which translates to a network hash rate of 462Mh/s.
As Coinhive mines roughly 8.5 blocks per day, they produce 1.18%
of all 720 blocks/day which translates to 5.5Mh/s. If we assume
that a web client performs between 20 to 100 h/s, then Coinhive
requires between 292K and 58K constantly mining users. Compare
our findings with numbers reported by Coinhive [4] from Septem-
ber 2017 is difficult. Coinhive wrote that their hash rate peaked
at 13.5Mh/s (then 5% of the network’s hash rate). However, our
results are averages over long periods of time and derived from
the statistical properties of the network, while those published are
momentary peak rates, thus a direct comparison is not possible.
If we sum up the block rewards of the actually mined blocks
over the observation period of four weeks, we find that Coinhive
earned 1,271XMR. Table 6 complements our four-week analysis
with three full months in 2018 showing its continuity. Similar to
other cryptocurrencies, Monero’s exchange-rate fluctuates heavily,
at the time of writing one XMR is worth 120 USD, having peaked at
400 USD at the beginning of 2018. Thus, assuming 120 USD, Coin-
hive mines Moneros worth around 150,000 USD per month of which
they say, they give 70% to their users. Still, the operational costs
seem manageable, making it potentially profitable for Coinhive.
Takeaway. Coinhive currently contributes ∼1.18% of the mining
power of the Monero network. While probably profitable for Coinhive,
it remains questionable whether mining is a feasible ad alternative.
5 RELATEDWORK
Browser-based mining has been subject to substantial media cover-
age, e.g., reports on Pirate Bay [9] mining, about hacked websites
for mining [28], miners injected into the Google’s DoubleClick ad-
platform [26] or drive-by Monero mining on Android [22]. Many
blog posts exist that report on Alexa-listed websites to include min-
ing code [2, 17], however, without detailing a methodology. A list
published on Github [21] provides an overview of potential mining
domains. However, this list also includes entries such as google.com
which is unlikely to be mining. To the best of our knowledge, [8]
are the first to academically investigate browser-based mining par-
allel to our work. While they also find Coinhive to be the most
prominent service, their analysis is based on a string search over
a large set of HTTP bodies, thus not accounting for actual HTML
structure which we did in our first analysis (see Section 3.1) which
showed to already produce skewed results, e.g., the categories of
websites significantly differs. We thus complement their results by
incorporating WebAssembly fingerprinting and further shed light
on the inner workings of Coinhive. In concurrent work, Konoth
et al. [13] estimate revenue for websites on the Alexa Top 1M in-
cluding mining scripts. Further, they also analyze the nature of
Wasm mining for detection using a very similar methodology to
what was the basis for our fingerprinting such as counting certain
instruction or memory access pattern. Based on monitoring DNS,
[1] also observes Coinhive as the dominant player. They report
that most crypto miners are present on adult websites in the Alexa
Top 1K/3K. Similar with regards to link-forwarders, [14] analyzed
ad-based link forwarding services and their revenue model which
relates to that of Coinhive, thus we believe their results to also
apply here.
6 CONCLUSION
This paper analyzes the prevalence of browser-based mining, a new
revenue generating model to monetize websites and an alternative
to ad-based financing that is enabled by ASIC resistant cryptocur-
rencies such as Monero. By inspecting 137M .com/.net/.org and
Alexa Top 1M domains for mining code, we indeed find websites
that utilize browser-mining. Yet, the prevalence of browser mining
is currently low at < 0.08% of the probed sites. For its detection,
we find the public NoCoin filter list to be insufficient to broadly
detect browser mining. We thus present a new technique based
on WebAssembly fingerprinting to identify miners, up to 82% of
thereby identified mining websites are not detected by block lists.
We identify Coinhive as the largest web-based mining provider
used by 75% of the mining sites. Given its popularity, we further
dissect Coinhives’ link-forwarding service. We find that 10 heavy
users contribute over 80% of all short links mostly targeting stream-
ing and filesharing services. The remaining short links target a
diverse set of websites. We continue by dissecting the economics of
Coinhive, we devise a new method that allows associating mined
blocks with a mining pool and we find that Coinhive mines 1.18%
of all Monero blocks and their visitors have a combined median
hash rate of 5.5Mh/s. While we find that Coinhive turns around
Moneros worth 150,000 USD per month, the current value stability
of cryptocurrencies requires further investigations if browser-based
mining can be an alternative revenue model to ad-based financ-
ing. Further, the impact of the CPU intensive miner on a website’s
performance, a mobile device’s battery lifetime or a visitor’s en-
ergy bill is yet to be quantified but it could be a huge hurdle to be
competitive to ad-based financing on a larger scale.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Funded by the Excellence Initiative of the German federal and state
governments, as well as by the German Research Foundation (DFG)
as part of project B1within the Collaborative Research Center (CRC)
1053 – MAKI. Further, we thank Martin Coughlan from Symantec
for granting us access to the RuleSpace classification engine as well
as the network operators at RWTH Aachen University, especially
Jens Hektor and Bernd Kohler.
Digging into Browser-based Crypto Mining IMC ’18, October 31–November 2, 2018, Boston, MA, USA
REFERENCES
[1] 360Netlabs and Xu Yang. 2018. Who is Stealing My Power: Web Mining Domains
Measurement via DNSMon. http://web.archive.org/web/20180515135858/http:
//blog.netlab.360.com/who-is-stealing-my-power-web-mining-domains-
measurement-via-dnsmon-en/. Archived on 2018-05-15.
[2] AdGuard. 2017. Cryptocurrency mining affects over 500 million people. And they
have no idea it is happening. http://web.archive.org/web/20180515160301/https:
//adguard.com/en/blog/crypto-mining-fever/. Archived on 2018-05-15.
[3] ChromeDevTools. 2018. DevTools Protocol API docs – its domains, methods,
and events. http://web.archive.org/web/20180517161942/https://github.com/
ChromeDevTools/debugger-protocol-viewer. Archived on 2018-05-17.
[4] Coinhive. 2017. First Week Status Report. http://web.archive.org/web/
20180515151445/https://coinhive.com/blog/status-report. Archived on 2018-
05-15.
[5] Coinhive. 2018. Coinhive – Monero JavaScript Mining. https://web.archive.org/
web/20180515073251/https://coinhive.com/. Archived on 2018-05-15.
[6] Crypto-Loot. 2018. Crypto-Loot - AWeb BrowserMiner | TrafficMiner | CoinHive
Alternative. https://web.archive.org/web/20180515073236/https://crypto-loot.
com/. Archived on 2018-05-15.
[7] Robert DeVoe. 2017. Tombs.io Launches Collaborative Online Game Powered by
Monero Mining. http://web.archive.org/web/20180516070407/https://btcmanager.
com/tombs-io-launches-collaborative-online-game-powered-monero-mining/.
Archived on 2018-05-16.
[8] Shayan Eskandari, Andreas Leoutsarakos, Troy Mursch, and Jeremy Clark. 2018.
A first look at browser-based Cryptojacking. In IEEE Security & Privacy on the
Blockchain.
[9] Guardian. 2017. Ads don’t work so websites are using your electric-
ity to pay the bills. http://web.archive.org/web/20180515115349/https:
//www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/sep/27/pirate-bay-showtime-ads-
websites-electricity-pay-bills-cryptocurrency-bitcoin. Archived on 2018-05-15.
[10] Guardian. 2017. Billions of video site visitors unwittingly mine cryptocur-
rency as they watch. http://web.archive.org/web/20180516072539/https:
//www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/dec/13/video-site-visitors-
unwittingly-mine-cryptocurrency-as-they-watch-report-openload-
streamango-rapidvideo-onlinevideoconverter-monero. Archived on
2018-05-16.
[11] Oliver Hohlfeld. 2018. Operating a DNS-based Active Internet Observatory. In
ACM SIGCOMM Posters and Demos.
[12] Hosh (hoshsadiq). 2018. Github: Block lists to prevent JavaScript min-
ers. http://web.archive.org/web/20180517153826/https://github.com/hoshsadiq/
adblock-nocoin-list. Archived on 2018-05-17.
[13] Radhesh Krishnan Konoth, Emanuele Vineti, Veelasha Moonsamy, Martina
Lindorfer, Christopher Kruegel, Herbert Bos, and Giovanni Vigna. 2018.
MineSweeper: An In-depth Look into Drive-by Cryptocurrency Mining and
Its Defense. In ACM CCS.
[14] Nick Nikiforakis, Federico Maggi, Gianluca Stringhini, M. Zubair Rafique, Wouter
Joosen, Christopher Kruegel, Frank Piessens, Giovanni Vigna, and Stefano Zanero.
2014. Stranger Danger: Exploring the Ecosystem of Ad-based URL Shortening
Services. In ACM WWW ’14.
[15] Omsk Social Club and !Mediengruppe Bitnik. 2018. Cryptorave #5 Alexiety -
0b673cce.xyz. http://web.archive.org/web/20180515160638/https://0b673cce.xyz/.
Archived on 2018-05-15.
[16] Paper Authors. 2018. Coinhive Link Forwarding Example to Youtube. http:
//web.archive.org/web/20180516094141/https://cnhv.co/3w88o. Archived on
2018-05-16.
[17] Pixalate. 2017. Pixalate unveils the list of sites secretly mining for cryptocur-
rency. http://web.archive.org/web/20180515155855/http://blog.pixalate.com/
coinhive-cryptocurrency-mining-cpu-site-list. Archived on 2018-05-15.
[18] Proofpoint. 2018. Smominru Monero mining botnet making mil-
lions for operators. https://web.archive.org/web/20180515071304/https:
//www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/smominru-monero-mining-
botnet-making-millions-operators. Archived on 2018-05-15.
[19] Public Interest Registry. 2018. Zone File Access. http://pir.org/.
[20] Jan Rüth. 2018. Coinhive Paper Tools. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1421702.
[21] Paul Sec. 2018. Extract from the Top 1M Alexa domains (and
also from investigations) using coin-hive mining service. http:
//web.archive.org/web/20180515161228/https://gist.github.com/PaulSec/
029d198a1e049acead74c31db0de1466. Archived on 2018-05-15.
[22] Jérôme Segura. 2018. Drive-by cryptomining campaign targets millions
of Android users. http://web.archive.org/web/20180515162842/https:
//blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2018/02/drive-by-cryptomining-
campaign-attracts-millions-of-android-users/. Archived on 2018-05-15.
[23] Seigen, Max Jameson, Tuomo Nieminen, Neocortex, and Antonio M. Juarez. 2013.
CryptoNight Hash Function. CRYPTONOTE STANDARD 008.
[24] Symantec. 2018. Advanced Web Intelligence - RuleSpace | Syman-
tec. http://web.archive.org/web/20180516095136/https://www.symantec.com/
products/rulespace. Archived on 2018-05-16.
[25] The Monero Project. 2018. Monero - secure, private, untraceable. http://web.
archive.org/web/20180517083008/https://getmonero.org. Archived on 2018-05-
17.
[26] TrendMicro. 2018. Malvertising Campaign Abuses Google’s DoubleClick to De-
liver Cryptocurrency Miners. http://web.archive.org/web/20180515134601/https:
//blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/malvertising-campaign-
abuses-googles-doubleclick-to-deliver-cryptocurrency-miners/. Archived on
2018-05-15.
[27] Verisign. 2018. Zone Files For Top-Level Domains (TLDs). verisign.com.
[28] Mark Ward. 2018. Websites hacked to mint crypto-cash. http://web.archive.org/
web/20180515154917/http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-41518351. Archived
on 2018-05-15.
[29] WebAssembly Community Group. 2018. WebAssembly. http://web.archive.org/
web/20180525093453/https://webassembly.org. Archived on 2018-05-25.
[30] Jason Whitehorn. 2011. jsMiner. http://web.archive.org/web/20180517091106/
https://github.com/jwhitehorn/jsMiner. Archived on 2018-05-17.
